Abstract. Very few known cryptographic primitives are based on noncommutative algebra. Each new scheme is of substantial interest, because noncommutative constructions are secure agains many standard cryptographic attacks. On the other hand, cryptography does not provide security proofs that would allow to base the security of a cryptographic primitive on structural complexity assumptions. Thus, it is important to investigate weaker notions of security. In this paper we introduce new constructions of cryptographic primitives based on group invariants and oer new ways to strengthen them for practical use. Besides, we introduce the notion of provable break which is a weaker version of the regular cryptographic break. In this version, an adversary should have a proof that he has correctly decyphered the message. We prove that cryptosystems based on matrix groups invariants and a version of the Anshel-Anshel-Goldfeld key agreement protocol for modular groups are secure against provable break unless NP = RP.
Algebraic cryptography
Public-key cryptography, since its very beginning [16, 53] , has been actively employing algebraic constructions. The RSA protocol, for example, is based on number theory; the very construction of the protocol requires computing the Euler totient, ϕ(n). Its security is based on factoring a number into prime divisors, or, more precisely, on the hardness of the so-called ¾RSA problem¿: nd roots of a given degree modulo a number n = pq, where p and q are prime (this task may not be equivalent to factoring; see [14, 15, 54] for more information).
However, usually the term algebraic cryptography is used in a narrower meaning. Algebraic cryptography deals with constructions where encoding and decoding are both group homomorphisms. In [29] Grigoriev and Ponomarenko give the following denition of a homomorphic cryptosystem (compare with Denition 2, where we introduce the general notion of a cryptosystem).
Denition 1 Let H be a nite nonidentity group, G a nitely generated group, and f : G → H an epimorphism. Assume that R is a set of distinct representatives of the right cosets of
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Ker(f ) in G, A is a set of words in some alphabet, and a mapping P : A → G satises Im(P ) = Ker(f ). A triple S = (R, A, P ) is called a homomorphic cryptosystem over H with respect to f if the following conditions are satised: one can generate random elements (of the sets A, G, H), compute the inverse of an element and the product of two elements (in the group G or H) in probabilistic polynomial (in N ) time where N is the size of presentations of G, H, and A; |R| = |H|, and the image f (g) of every element g ∈ R as well as the unique preimage g ∈ R such that f (g) = h of every element h ∈ H can be computed in probabilistic polynomial (in N ) time; the mapping P is a trapdoor function.
Formally speaking, even in this stricter sense algebraic cryptography was introduced almost at the same time as public key cryptography: the quadratic residue cryptosystem was the rst homomorphic cryptosystem and one of the rst known cryptosystems in general [22, 23] .
However, algebraic cryptography in its modern sense stems from the works on elliptic curve cryptography [37, 45] . The basic constructions of elliptic curve primitives dier very little from the constructions based on discrete logarithm, such as the Die-Hellman key agreement protocol. The main dierence is that elliptic curve crypto computes in an abelian group of points of an elliptic curve of the form y +b; it allows to reduce the key size substantially and make the cryptosystems more ecient [10, 32, 58] . Lately the US government introduced a number of cryptographic standards based on elliptic curve cryptography.
Note that both classical constructions and elliptic curve crypto deal with abelian groups. This additional structure allows to make encoding and decoding algorithms even more ecient, while the analysis of arising computational tasks simplies. However, over the last ten years abelian constructions were found to be susceptible to a new kind of cryptographic attacks, quantum computing. Beginning from the seminal works of Peter Shor [9, 55] , factoring and discrete logarithm were solved in a simple and ecient manner on a quantum computer for abelian groups [24] (see also [42, 48] and Chapter 20 of [7] ). In fact, a quantum computer is able to eciently solve the problem of calculating the order of an element in an abelian group (via quantum Fourier transforms), and this problem generalized discrete logarithm.
Discrete logarithm and factoring were eectively the base of all classical crypto, including elliptic curve crypto. Thus, in a situation when quantum computing is already gradually becoming feasible (although the prospects are not clear yet), cryptography cannot limit itself to commutative constructions anymore. Cryptographers aim to create nonabelian constructions which are expected to be more secure [5] .
That's why elliptic constructions and classical Die-Hellman and RSA constructions were generalized, and the task of constructing homomorphic cryptosystems was introduced in [19, 60] . First steps in using algebraic constructions, in particular group theory, for building cryptographic primitives were made in [8, 47, 49, 50] . An important step on the road of nonabelian cryptographic constructions were the works of Anshel, Anshel, and Goldfeld [24] . We will focus on one of their constructions in Section 9
These ideas were further developed in the works of Grigoriev and Ponomarenko. They developed basic denitions, such as Denition 1, and build constructions of nonabelian homomorphic public-key cryptosystems [29] , homomorphic public-key cryptosystems over rings [28] , and a general scheme of building complex homomorphic cryptosystems from smaller blocks [31] (this scheme will play an important part in this work). They also investigated the connections between homomorphic cryptosystems and encoding Boolean circuits [30] .
In [25] , Grigoriev suggested a method to use group invariants for public-key cryptography. In Section 5 we will discuss this construction in detail, but now we proceed to provable break the second basic idea of the present work. This paper is a revised and extended version of [27] .
Weak results in modern cryptography
Modern cryptography virtually does not allow one to prove the security of public key primitives. From the very rst Die-Hellman key agreement protocol [16] and the RSA public key cryptosystem [53] , numerous cryptographic constructions have been devised, but not a single proof of their security has appeared yet. Indeed, it would be very hard to nd an unconditional proof since it would necessarily include the proof of P = NP. However, conditional proofs of the kind ¾if P = NP then a protocol is secure¿ are also hard to get. The matter here is that the classic notion of cryptographic security is naturally connected with average-case complexity rather than classical worst-case complexity.
Let us begin with a classic notion of semantic security of a cryptosystem; to dene it we will have to begin with the denition of a cryptosystem [22] .
Denition 2 A public-key encryption scheme S consists of three probabilistic worst-case polynomial-time algorithms (G, E, D) for key generation, encryption and decryption respectively.
The key generation algorithm G on input 1 n (the security parameter) produces a pair G(1 n ) = (e, d) of public and secret keys. The encryption algorithm E takes as input a public key e and a plaintext message m and produces a ciphertext 
Informally speaking, every adversary who knows the distribution of messages M and receives as input the encoded message and the public key will not be able to decode it substantially more often than an algorithm that does not know anything except M (M is necessary because if, for example, only one message were transmitted all the time then an adversary would indeed be able to decode it, not even needing the code and the public key). The main problem here is that the probabilities in this denition are taken over the distribution on the inputs of the cryptosystem, over the messages; this is, of course, natural because in practice it is usually enough to break a cryptosystem on a substantial fraction of the inputs, not necessarily on all of them.
Recent results allowed to connect cryptographic security (in the sense of Denition 3) with worst-case complexity assumptions for certain problems [1, 17, 51, 52] . However, these assumptions so far appear articial and, as before, do not translate into assumptions about (in)equality of some complexity classes. In general, it seems that modern cryptography still has a very long way to go before any provably secure constructions. There even exists evidence supporting the view that such constructions may not exist or may lead to improbable corollaries for complexity classes [13] .
Thus, is it natural that researchers, having encountered a problem too hard, began work on alternative denitions, criteria, and contexts trying to prove security of some constructions in some denitions.
The rst natural approach would be to consider not the real cryptographic primitives but their weaker counterparts, like one-way functions (note that a one-way function does not imply a public-key cryptosystem, one would need a trapdoor function for it). Indeed, results on one-way functions are easier to prove. For example, complete one-way functions (by a complete one-way function we mean such a function f that if one-way functions exist then f is a one-way function) have been known for quite a long time already [21, 40] , while complete public-key cryptosystems appeared only recently in the works of Harnik et al. and Grigoriev et al. [26, 33] . Moreover, recently Levin developed more natural combinatorial constructions of complete one-way functions [41] ; this work was continued by recent results by the Kojevnikov and Nikolenko [38] .
Another approach that also leads to weaker results is to change the notion of security itself. If we consider weaker notions of security we are able to construct provably secure primitives. For example, consider the theory of feebly one-way functions, developen by A. Hiltgen [34, 35] . Hiltgen considered the circuit complexity of functions in the complete binary basis which is the hardest case for proving lower bounds [12, 59] . He managed to devise a linear invertible function such that computing this function is almost twice easier than inverting it. These bounds, however weak, were the rst unconditional security proofs for one-way functions. Lately, Hirsch and Nikolenko have created a feebly secure trapdoor function [36] ; it appears possible to devise a provably secure cryptosystem along the same lines (security understood in an extremely restricted sense, of course).
On the other hand, partial results were obtained under the assumption of a very strong adversary, a worst-case adversary who breaks the code in all cases. No wonder that in this setting one could base security on worst-case complexity assumptions [18, 39] . For a detailed survey on the subject we refer the reader to the book [46] and to previous papers of the rst author [30, 31] .
In the next section we introduce and investigate another approach to weakening the notion of security. It turns out that our denition of provable break, while being somewhat articial, allows to associate provable break of invariant-based cryptosystems and AnshelAnshel-Goldfeld key agreement protocols with worst-case structural complexity assumptions.
Provable break
Consider a system with three participants: Alice, Bob, and Charlie. Suppose that, as usual, Alice (A) and Bob (B) are engaged in a cryptographic protocol (in a key agreement protocol Alice and Bob are equal peers, and in a public key cryptosystem Alice forms a pair of public and secret keys and emits the public key, while Bob encodes his message and sends it to Alice over an open channel), and Charlie tries to eavesdrop, decoding the messages that Bob sends to Alice. But now Charlie's task is dierent: not only does he need to decipher Bob's message, he also he wants to be able to prove that his decoded message is actually what Bob had in mind. Perhaps, Charlie does not really trust the results he receives; perhaps, he has a boss who does not trust Charlie's algorithm of breaking the protocol. This is (informally) what we call a provable break.
In this setting, it is not sucient for Charlie just to recover the encrypted message m from a ciphertext c, he should also justify that it is possible to encode m into c. What could serve as such a justication? We take the following natural idea as denition: in the provable break security model an adversary given a codeword E(m) should not only produce the message m, but also present suitable random bits of E that might lead to such a cipher. Remark 1. In what follows we (equivalently) redene the encoding algorithm E as a deterministic worst-case polynomial time algorithm with access to a random string r. It receives as input the public key e, the message m, and a random bit string r and outputs the encoded message E(r, e, m) = c.
There may be several sets of random bits {r 1 , . . . , r k } that produce the same cipher: E(m, pk, r 1 ) = . . . = E(m, pk, r k ). In this case, of course, an adversary only needs to present some random string that results in the cipher, not necessarily the one Bob actually used (when k > 1, Charlie has absolutely no chance to nd it anyway).
Informal discussion of provable break began in connection with the RabinGoldwasser Micali cryptosystem based on quadratic residues [22] . It was shown that provable break of this cryptosystem implies that factoring is contained in RP. However, we know of no reference where a formal denition was presented and studied.
As we have already mentioned in Sec. 2, one of the most fundamental unsolved questions in theoretical cryptography is to construct a secure encryption scheme based on some natural complexity assumptions like P =NP. In this paper, we present two slightly dierent denitions of provable break (one weaker than the other) and prove that two dierent cryptographic protocols, namely the Anshel-Anshel-Goldfeld key agreement protocol and cryptosystems based on group invariants are all secure against provable worst-case break provided NP ⊆RP. For the latter cryptosystem, we develop new ways to provide for their security in the usual cryptographic sense.
Denitions
First we dene provable break of public key cryptosystems and then extend it to key agreement protocols. We present two separate denitions, one of them for the average case, and one for the worst case. First, we recollect Denition 2 ad dene the corresponding provable break.
Denition 4 An adversary C performs provable break of a cryptosystem (G, E, D) if for
a uniform distribution over messages m and random bits of all participating algorithms (the public key pk is taken from the pair (pk, sk) generated by the key generation algorithm G(1
where E(m, pk, r ) = E(m, pk, r), and n is the security parameter.
The security parameter in Denition 4 is eectively the key length; the security parameter should be chosen such that the known adversary algorithms would run long enough to make break hopeless.
If E is deterministic then provable break is equivalent to usual break (the set of random bits is empty). An adversary can prove that he has correctly decoded a message by encoding it again. This is precisely the idea of provable break: an adversary should not only decipher the message, but also check that the cipher is actually a valid one; while the former may be trivial (as it will be in some of our examples), the latter may be very hard.
We also introduce the notion of a very strong adversary that breaks the cryptosystem in the worst case. The dierence with the usual break is that the adversary should be successful on all inputs.
Denition 5 An adversary C performs provable worst-case break of a cryptosystem (G, E, D) if for all messages m, all pairs of keys (pk, sk) generated by G(1 n ), and all random bits of the encoding algorithm E
where E(m, pk, r ) = E(m, pk, r), n is the security parameter, and the distribution is taken over the random bits of the adversary C.
We say that a cryptosystem (G, E, D) is secure against provable (worst-case) break if there is no polynomial probabilistic Turing machine C performing provable (worst-case) break of (G, E, D). Remark 2. It is easy to think of a trivial cryptosystem which is secure against provable break (in the sense of Denition 4 which automatically makes it secure against worst case provable break in the sense of Denition 5). Let Bob transfer the message openly (decryption is thus trivial), but add a value of some one-way function to the end of the message. Alice may disregard this one-way function, but Charlie would have to invert this one-way function in order to get a valid set of Bob's random bits. Therefore, our task is not to simply devise cryptosystems that are secure against provable break, but to devise them in such a way that they are or at least may be made secure in the usual cryptographic sense. Of course, we cannot prove their security, but we provide constructions that we believe to produce reasonably secure cryptosystems.
5 Invariant-based cryptosystems and their provable break
Cryptosystems based on group invariants
In [25] , D. Grigoriev suggested a new class of public-key cryptosystems based on group invariants. In an invariant-based cryptosystem, Alice chooses a group G ≤ GL(n, F ) acting on some vector space F n . As a secret key, Alice chooses a set X and an invariant f :
. She also selects a set (or a space given by generators) of
. Thus, an invariant-based cryptosystem is dened by a triple (G, f, M ). As the public key Alice transmits generators of G and M .
Bob selects a vector m ∈ M (m is Bob's message) and a random element g ∈ G. After that, Bob communicates gm to Alice. Alice can decipher the message by taking the invariant f (gm) = f (m). Since she had chosen the set of messages M as a transversal set for the orbits, the value of f (m) allows her to uniquely determine the original message m. We call a triple (G, f, M ) admissible if it correctly denes an invariantbased cryptosystem.
It is now clear that the primary concern of the security of invariant-based cryptosystems is to nd a well-concealed invariant. In what follows we give several ways to do so. These ways are similar to the ones employed in [31] and may be summarized with the following construction. Consider a tree such that each node of the tree contains a triple (G, f, M ). Alice builds this tree from the leaves to the root, at each step keeping track of G, f , and M . After the tree is created, Alice takes the cryptosystem from the root and uses it. An adversary will thus be able to break the cryptosystem if he knows the structure of the tree (we suppose that cryptosystems in the leaves are easy to break, otherwise there is no point to construct a tree). This structure is equivalent to the description of the invariant from the security point of view, and may also be considered as Alice's secret key. The security of this cryptosystem will rely on the diculty of the conjugacy and membership problems, as in [31] (see Section 6 for details).
An invariant-based cryptosystem secure against provable break unless NP⊆RP
The construction is based on the modular group. The modular group is the multiplicative group SL 2 (Z) of 2×2-matrices of determinant 1 (unimodular matrices). Algebraic properties of this group are described in detail in, for example, [6] . In [11, Corollary 11.5] Blass and Gurevich proved that the following bounded membership problem (BM) for the modular group is NP-complete. 
is in S?
Remark 3. Do not confuse this problem with other problems that in [11] are proven to be DistNP-complete (complete with respect to average case reductions). The primary dierence is that in this case we are dealing with group membership, while RNP-complete problems arise from checking membership in semigroups.
Let us take G to be the unimodular group
As the invariant we take a rather trivial map
and as the message space the space of vectors
Bob selects a random element g in the given group (obtained by multiplying not more than, say, N generators), transports the message vector m into gm and transmits gm and N . Alice computes f (gm) and decides which m it was. Note that this cryptosystem is trivial to break: encryption does not change the part of the vector that actually carries the message. However, we will presently see that its provable break is NP-hard.
Theorem 1 If there is a polynomial adversary C performing provable worst-case break of the invariant-based cryptosystem described above then NP ⊆ RP.
Proof. In short, the provable break is NP-hard because the Integer Sum problem is easily reduced to deciding bounded membership in a subgroup of the modular group, as shown in [11] .
First, note that 1 λ 0 1
Thus, the problem of deciding bounded membership in a subgroup of the modular group is equivalent to the problem of deciding whether a given number is expressible as a bounded sum of other given numbers. This is the Integer Sum problem, shown to be NP-complete in [11] . If a polynomial-time algorithm solves a search problem with success probability 1 n Const , this probability can be easily amplied to 3/4 by repeating the algorithm for a polynomial number of times and taking the majority vote as an answer. Therefore, if a polynomially bounded adversary provably worst-case breaks the cryptosystem presented then NP ⊆ RP.
In Sections 6 and 7 we present constructions aimed at making invariant-based cryptosystems more reasonable from the security viewpoint. 6 The tree of groups
General remarks
The invariant-based protocol described in the previous section shares a discouraging property with the cryptosystem presented in a remark in Section 4. It is easy to break in the common cryptographic sense. In this section we provide a construction that allows us to hide these primitives inside a large tree of groups. We can also use it to improve security of the AnshelAnshel-Goldfeld key agreement protocol.
We follow the lines of [31] to produce a tree of groupinvariantmessages triples such that knowing the structure of the tree one can eciently calculate the invariant in its root, while without knowing the structure the invariant is concealed behind computationally hard problems in the tree.
In what follows, we concentrate on the invariant-based cryptosystems (introduced in Section 5) since [31] can be directly applied to key agreement protocols described in Section 9. However, we have to develop several new techniques to handle invariant-based cryptosystems. We will consider the same operations as in [31] and look at what happens with the invariants. But rst let us introduce some basic notions.
To each vertex v of the tree we attach a triple (G v , f v , M v ). Triples are produced by recursion on the vertices of the tree starting with leaves towards the root to each vertex. At each step, we apply one of the operations described below. For every vertex v the group G v is a matrix group G v ≤ GL(n, R) for some n and some base ring R.
Thus, a tree corresponds to the resulting triple
n is a canonical set of messages with the property that ∀m = m ∈ M f (m) = f (m ). The public key consists of R, n, G (given by matrix generators), and M . The point of building such a tree is to conceal the secret invariant. Remark 4. Note that in situations where we change the invariant we can either change the invariant from f to f • h or change the message space from M to h(M ). Since we care about concealing the invariant, and the message space is to be given publicly, we will always choose the rst alternative.
We want to combine this regular security with provable worst-case security of the modular group that we have proven in Theorem 1. To do this, we place a provably secure construction based on the modular group in one of the leaves of the tree. Then, for Charlie to solve the membership problem in the root of the tree, Charlie would have to solve the membership problem for all leaves of the tree (our construction has this property).
Base of recursion
To treat the construction formally, consider a class of groups G closed under a certain set of grouptheoretical operations O (we list the relevant operations below) on triples (G, f, M ) that preserve admissibility. For a set G 0 ⊂ G (which is the base of the construction) we dene recursively a class P(G 0 , O) of quadruples (G, f, M, T ) in the following way. (G, f, M, T ) , where G ∈ G 0 , (G, f, M ) is an admissible triple, and T is a single node labeled by G. 
Base of recursion: any quadruple

Recursive step: given quadruples {(G
i , f i , M i , T i )} s i=1 and an operation o ∈ O of arity s, the class P(G 0 , O) contains the quadruple (G, f, M, T ), where G = o(G 1 , . . . , G s ), f = o(f 1 , . . . , f s ), M = o(M 1 , . . . , M s ),
Recursive step
Let us now list the building blocks of the tree, the operations acting on admissible triples. A number of such operations were introduced in [30] ; we have to check what happens with the invariants in these cases.
Changing the base ring φ : R → R . If the ring becomes smaller (R embeds in R with
ϕ : R → R, and φϕ = id), an invariant f transforms into an invariant φ(f ) that acts like
If the ring becomes larger, bad things may happen (since there are new elements in the ring now, old equalities may not hold anymore). This property allows us to reason that any invariant known from invariant theory over elds will carry on to the rings that are subsets of these elds; e.g. any invariant over C will be an invariant over Z. However, this action requires care about the message space. If there were dierent representatives m, m ∈ M such that φ(m) = φ(m ) then the corresponding messages will be considered identical in the resulting message space φ(M ). Therefore, it is sensible to reduce the underlying ring only if φ(M ) is nontrivial.
The message space M does not change.
We here consider the natural representation of the direct product; if
We can choose a random element of this set, and the message space will in any case become M 1 × M 2 (if we do not need that many dierent messages, we can choose several at random and discard the others). 4. Wreath product G H, where G ≤ GL(n, R), H ≤ S m . In this case, we take the natural representation of G H on R mn acting as
In this case, for any invariant f , if ∀g ∈ G, x ∈ R n f (gx) = f (x) the same will hold for G H if we take f m to act componentwise. The permutation disturbs nothing in the invariant equality. The message space will grow correspondingly to M m (again, we may choose several messages at random or choose the diagonal ∆ = {(x, . . . , x) | x ∈ M } if we do not need that many messages).
Apart from the previously considered ways to extend the tree, invariant theory suggests new ways. We can consider several transformations o ∈ O that leave the group intact (o(G) = G) and only change the invariant f and the message space M . The following will only work if f is a polynomial.
Hessians H(f ). If f is a polynomial invariant of G, and ∀g ∈ G ≤ GL(n, F ) det g = ±1
(note that F is a eld) then
is also an invariant. The group G and the message space M remain unchanged. 2. Jacobian J . If f 1 , . . . , f n are polynomial invariants of G ≤ SL(n, F ) (note that F is a eld) then
is also an invariant. In this way we can unite n identical groups with dierent invariants into one; this will probably be useful only on the rst level of the tree, where we can choose arbitrarily many identical groups.
The leaves of the tree
The previous section explains how to build a new invariant out of existing ones (thus, the recursive step). The question that remains is to nd the base of this recursion. What should we put in the leaves of this tree?
General remarks
The rst remark we should make is that in computer science, we cannot truly work over C or R. Anything we do is actually over Q. Invariant theory over Q is a little dierent from the classic well-known invariant theory over C. Fortunately, we don't have to throw away the theory: if f is an invariant of a group G ≤ GL(n, C) represented by matrices with rational coecients, then it is still an invariant of the group G ≤ GL(n, Q) because elements of G have rational coecients. Therefore, in what follows we will refer to invariants over C but they will always be the same for Q. We may also look at invariants over nite elds, usually called modular invariants, but they provide a completely dierent story with completely dierent theory (see Example 4 in Section 7.3).
Orbit Chern classes
As an example of a standard well-known construction from invariant theory (see, e.g., [56] ) we remind the so-called orbit Chern classes. They provide most known invariants of nite groups. The idea is simple: take an orbit a G of an element a ∈ F n (suppose for the moment that G acts over a eld) and note that b∈a G (x + b) , where x is a formal variable, is invariant under G (elements of G only permute the factors in this expression). Its coecients are called orbit Chern classes. For example, b∈a G b is an invariant of G, namely the rst orbit Chern class.
All orbit Chern classes are nothing more than symmetric functions in the elements of the orbit; if we take a to be an unknown, we obtain the invariants we are looking for. Similar statements hold for compact groups.
Examples of nite groups' invariants
In this subsection we give several examples of invariants of dierent nite groups. The examples may be easily multiplied.
Example 1. The symmetric group S n has a monomial representation on F n S n → GL(n, F ) that permutes the variables. The ring of invariants in this case is generated by all symmetric polynomials, from x 1 + . . . + x n to x 1 . . . x n . This is a simple example of orbit Chern classes. Example 2. A cyclic group Z n may be represented by any matrix g ∈ GL(m, F ) such that g n = e (a unipotent matrix of a matching order). For a function f to be an invariant of a cyclic group's representation, it suces to ensure that it remains unchanged under the action of the only generator:
For example, a cyclic group Z n is naturally represented by a subgroup generated by ξ n e, where ξ n is a primitive n-th root of unity and e is the identity matrix. Obviously, any homogeneous polynomial of degree n is an invariant of this group. We can go one step further and consider the representation of a cyclic group Z n generated by a matrix    Note that invariants depend not only on groups themselves, but also on their representations; the same group with dierent representations can have dierent invariants. Example 3. A dihedral group D 2k has a representation D 2k → GL(2, R) as the symmetry group of a regular polygon. In this representation D 2k is generated by two matrices:
Then the invariant ring of the dihedral group in this representation is generated by polynomials
Example 4. For an odd prime p the dihedral group D 2p has a representation D 2p → GL(2, F p ) over the nite eld F p given by the matrices
In this case the invariant ring is isomorphic to F p [y, (xy
]. However, if we switch to the dual representation (by simply transposing the matrices), the invariants will change substantially; the ring will now be isomorphic to
]. In this example it was important that the group was represented over a nite eld of degree not coprime with the group's degree.
These two examples show how much invariants depend on the actual representation. Some other examples of invariants of nite and classical groups one can nd in [25] .
Invariants of classical groups
In this subsection, we give two examples of well-known invariants of classical groups. They may also lie in the leaves of the tree of groups.
Example 5. The orthogonal group in an even dimension SO(2l, F ) has the well-known Dickson invariant: if charF = 2, which we will assume to be the case, it is (−1)
det g for a g ∈ SO(2l, F ). This invariant works for any eld with characteristic not equal to two. Note that this invariant only has two values, so it is good for encrypting only one bit.
Example 6. The symplectic group Sp(2n, F ) by denition preserves a nondegenerate skew-symmetric bilinear form. The value of this form is an invariant (and, unlike the previous example, a polynomial invariant). 
Attacks on invariant-based cryptosystems
Linear algebra attacks
The most dreaded attacks on algebraic cryptosystems usually go by linear algebra: an adversary constructs a system of linear equations and nds the secret key (the most notable example of this approach breaks the Polly Cracker scheme [20] that was only recently augmented with special techniques to make linear algebra attacks less ecient [44] ).
Suppose that the invariant f is a polynomial of degree d. In this case, an adversary can view it as a polynomial with Example 7. Suppose that we are trying to build an invariant-based cryptosystem based on the monomial representation of the symmetric group S n generated by transpositions τ ij and its rst degree invariant
For the message space we should choose a number of vectors such that the sums of their coordinates are dierent; we denote them by m i = (m i1 , . . . , m in ). An adversary performing this kind of attack will simply consider a polynomial
and solve a system of equations to ensure that transpositions do not change h. The equation corresponding to τ ij is h(τ ij x) = h(x) which is equivalent to λ i = λ j . So, the adversary will arrive to the correct invariant (or a constant factor of it) after performing a polynomial algorithm. Note that in order to overcome this algorithm one should choose the message space in such a way that it contains messages with identical sums of elements. The adversary does not need to nd the same invariant, he only needs to nd an invariant that separates the vectors of M .
Monte-Carlo attack and orbit sizes
Another concern comes from the sizes of the orbits of elements of M . Indeed, suppose that an element m ∈ M has an orbit m G of polynomial size. In this case, an adversary has a polynomial chance of hitting the correct cipher E(m) by simply picking an element g ∈ G at random and comparing E(m) and gm. Thus, the elements of the message space should be chosen with care to ensure that their orbits are large.
Example 8. For a trivial yet representative example consider a message space consisting of a zero vector and some other vector (the following analysis will do for any subgroup of GL(n, F ) and any invariant). The size of the zero vector orbit is 1, so an adversary does not have to do anything: if he sees a zero vector, the message was zero, if he sees a nonzero vector it was the other vector that got encrypted.
Tree reconstruction attack
Finally, an adversary may attempt to reconstruct the tree with which the invariant was built. Along this way he will encounter, for example, of nding a matrix a such that a −1 Ga = H for given G and H. This is a well-known hard problem; for example, in [43] it is shown that Graph Isomorphism reduces to the problem of group conjugation. This kind of attacks was considered in detail in [30] ; the same reasoning applies in this case, since the task of reconstructing the tree has not become any easier. In fact, it has become harder, as the tree nodes are now augmented with invariants that may change nontrivially when going up the tree; consequently, to reconstruct a tree an adversary needs not only to reconstruct the groups but also to reconstruct invariants. 9 Anshel-Anshel-Goldfeld key agreement protocol secure against provable break
First we recall the construction of the Anshel-Anshel-Goldfeld key agreement protocol [3] . Let G be a group, and let two players A and B choose two subgroups of G
Remark 5. Note that everything shown below goes without change if instead of G A and G B we consider subsemigroups of GG A andG B generated by the same elements a 1 , . . . , a m  and b 1 , . . . , b n , respectively, but generated as semigroups rather than groups. All commutators are taken in the larger group G.
The group G and elements a i , 1 ≤ i ≤ m, and b j , 1 ≤ i ≤ n, are made public. Both players A and B randomly choose secret elements a ∈ G A and b ∈ G B as products of not more than N generators and transmit to each other the following sequences:
After this transmission, player A (resp. B) has a representation of the element a (resp. b) in the subgroup G A (resp. G B ). Therefore, he can compute a representation of the element b
ba) using elements of the sequence X A (resp. X B ). Thus, both players have shared a common key, namely the commutator
b.
An obvious necessary condition for this protocol to be secure is that the set of all commutators with a ∈ G A and b ∈ G B should contain at least two elements.
To provably break the Anshel-Anshel-Goldfeld key agreement protocol, one has to nd representations of certain elements a in G A and b in G B , where 
g ≤ N and p is some polynomial. Note that we can check the correctness of the answer of M , so we also assume that M produces only correct answers.
Using M , we can a construct probabilistic polynomial-time Turing machine M that contains p(N )/2 copies of M such that on input (X, {Y i } i , N ) it does the following. If G A and G B are semigroups, the BM problem is hard, moreover, on average [57] .
Note that the described key agreement protocol can be insecure against linear algebra attack (cf. Subsection 8.1): it gives an adversary the decision of the conjugacy problem which could be unique, provided that the ring generated by G A (or by G B ) coincides with the whole ring of matrices (that is the case if we build our protocol on the Blass-Gurevich groups). To make a cryptosystem more resistant against linear algebra attacks, one can replace G by a tree-like construction of groups or semigroups as in Section 6.
Formally speaking, we produce the following recursive construction for a class of groups G closed under a certain set of grouptheoretical operations O; this time we do not have to worry about admissible triples, and the operations are dened simply on groups of G. For a set G 0 ⊂ G (which is the base of the construction) we dene recursively a class P(G 0 , O) of pairs (G, T ).
The recursive denition is done precisely as in 6.2, omitting the constructions of the invariants and message spaces. In our case, the set O of admissible operations consists of changing the underlying ring, direct products, wreath products, and conjugations (same as for invariantbased cryptosystems, but without invariantspecic operations).
The security of the AnshelAnshelGoldfeld key agreement protocol for matrix groups relies on the following problem.
Linear Transporter Problem (LTP). Let R be a commutative ring, V be an R module and G ≤ GL(V, R). Given u ∈ V and v ∈ u G = {u g : g ∈ G} nd g ∈ G such that v = u g . If an adversary can eciently solve LTP, he can obviously break the AnshelAnshel Goldfeld protocol. In [31] , the following proposition was proven (Lemma 3.4).
Proposition 1 Let G ∈ G. Then, given a derivation tree of G, LTP for G can be solved in time polynomial in the size of the tree and the times of solving LTP for leaves of the tree.
Of course, this does not prove that security of the AnshelAnshelGoldfeld key agreement protocol in the root of the tree depends on the security of this protocol in the leaves of the tree. We have a much weaker statement that goes in the undesirable direction twice: if we can solve LTP we can break the AnshelAnshelGoldfeld protocol, and if we can solve LTP for leaves of the tree, we can solve LTP for its root. To prove security we would need to reverse both statements. However, this is the best we can do, and we know of no similar constructions with stronger dependencies.
Conclusions and further work
In the paper, we have introduced a new notion of provable break and provable security in general. While this notion is undoubtedly much weaker than regular cryptographic security, it appears natural, well-dened, and sensible. Moreover, this notion of security is on of the few known notions for which provable positive statements are possible. We have provided three examples of cryptographic protocols: an invariant-based cryptosystem secure against provable break (we have also substantially advanced the theory of invariant-based cryptosystems since [25] ) and a key agreement protocol secure against provable break, a special case of the Anshel-Anshel-Goldfeld key agreement protocol. We are sure that one can produce more examples along the same lines.
Therefore, on one hand, further work lies in the search for more cryptographic primitives secure against provable break. On the other hand, one also wishes to look for connections between provable break and other notions of security. It is easy to think of a trivial cryptosystem for which provable security is equivalent to regular cryptographic security (for example, Bob may not use random bits at all); however, it may be useful to look for nontrivial examples of the same. These lines will probably be similar to the research carried out by Ajtai and Dwork [1] later augmented by Regev [51, 52] . They managed to reduce a worst-case problem to an average-case one and thus produced a cryptosystem that is secure under some worst-case assumptions.
